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ABSTRACT 
 
One of the imperatives of the post-1994 government was to improve access to medicines and 
related pharmaceutical services to previously disadvantaged areas. The government 
implemented multiple strategies to achieve this goal.  
 
The first was to ensure the availability of quality affordable medicines to all its citizens. In the 
public sector, the government controlled the purchases through a tender system and ensured 
the availability and affordability of medicines to the majority of the population free at the point 
of service.  In 2004 the government introduced the Single Exit Price (SEP), a transparent 
pricing system in the private sector for all prescription medicines comprising of a fixed ex-
factory price with a logistics fee component (and value-added tax) for medicines sold to all 
purchasers other than the State.  
 
This study presents two papers that evaluated a basket of 50 originator medicines and its 
available generics using the WHO/HAI methodology. Data were obtained from community 
pharmacy and pharmacy software vendors and subjected to an Interrupted Time Series (ITS) 
evaluation, where the changes in slope and levels of the medicines before and after regulations 
were obtained.  
 
A second strategy was to look at opening up ownership of pharmacies with the goal of 
improving access to medicines and services. On 23 October 1997, Minister Zuma introduced 
the amendment to the Pharmacy Bill that intended removing the restriction that ‘only people 
registered as pharmacists may own a pharmacy.’ The objective of the open ownership policy 
change was to increase public access to pharmaceutical services by increasing the number of 
pharmacies, especially in outlying areas. This amendment came into effect in 2003.  
 
While no extensive studies have been performed in South Africa to examine this change in 
ownership impact, research has suggested that open ownership has contributed to the demise 
of community pharmacy in rural areas (Blignault, 2010; Lowe, 2009). However, a 
comprehensive longitudinal evaluation has not been undertaken to date. It is unclear whether 
South Africa benefited from this policy or repeated the same mistakes as other countries, that 
have deregulated ownership, have demonstrated. 
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The third paper examines the opening, transfer, and closing of all pharmaceutical licenses as 
per the South African Pharmacy Council register prior to the changes in regulation and post-
regulations up to 2014. Each license was tracked over time and mapped at a municipal and 
district level. The investigation further allowed for a population overlay to determine changes 
in access, ownership categories, and urban-rural access over time, and in this way, examined 
the impact of the change in policy and whether its intended outcomes were achieved. It 
addressed the gap in research and evidence in terms of the policy on the deregulation of 
pharmacy ownership. The research contributed to lessons for low- and middle-income (LMIC) 
countries, especially those on the African continent. 
 
Conclusions: 
Using interrupted time series methodology, the research confirmed that substantial price 
reductions were achieved through the Single Exit Price regulations. This was true in both the 
originator and generic medicine where possible savings were experienced in the private sector. 
While the liberalisation of the ownership laws in South Africa may have increased the number 
of pharmacies in the country it did not result in increased access in previously disadvantaged 
and rural  areas to any marked degree. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to achieve the fundamental goal of making healthcare available to all its population in 
South Africa, the democratic government introduced several health policy reforms since 1994. 
Any policy effort to improve health system performance must, as a matter of monitoring and 
evaluation, measure the appropriateness of its outcomes. Political scientists as early as the 
1970s recognised that public policies were rarely implemented as designed and that those 
policy outcomes were rarely achieved as desired1. It is imperative therefore, that any policy 
change that is implemented in a country, even though it may work well in another country must 
always be evaluated in context2. A perfect scenario is for evaluation of policy change to begin 
well before its implementation but because of a lack of data, scarce administrative and 
organisational resources most policymakers take strategic decisions with the hope that it will 
be effective and sustainable2. The more straightforward evaluation approach is a before-and-
after comparison, where outcomes are examined over time as reforms are implemented.  
The thesis focuses on policy changes that may impact on both access and availability of 
medicines in the South African private market. In particular, it examines the implementation 
of the Single Exit Price (SEP) of medicines in 2004 and the introduction of open ownership 
regulation of community pharmacies in the same period. The literature research is accompanied 
by empirical studies that examined the price of a basket of medicines (originator and generic) 
from 1994 to 2014 and traces pharmacy licenses during the same period. The findings evaluate 
the success and failures of the new policies and assists in making recommendations towards 
the implementation of the National Health Insurance (NHI) and Universal Health Coverage 
(UHC). To achieve equitable pharmaceutical care, access within easy reach of patients, quality 
of care, affordability, and availability are critical elements required for success.  
1.1. Background and Rationale for the Study 
 
In 1994 the South African Government was faced with increasing medicine costs, a feature of 
the previous healthcare system where medicine expenditure was the main cost driver in the 
1980 and early 1990’s3 with medicine expenditure reaching a 31.8% high of the total private 
market spend. This was in keeping with the several international reports in low- and middle -
income countries (LMICs) where spending on medicines accounted for between 20-60% of 
healthcare budgets4,5. South Africa had the added problem6 of the great racial divide in a two-
 14 
tiered healthcare system, the unequal distribution of resources both in infrastructure and 
healthcare professionals between urban and rural, and the high burden of disease that impacted 
the majority black population. The Government experienced the added burden of rectifying the 
wrongs of the past and finding solutions to the health crisis they found themselves in. The 
initiation phase of the generalised Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) epidemic from 1989 
to 1996 and the very rapid spread of the virus through 1996 to 20027 was a massive setback to 
the health plans as envisaged in the health charter. The health system inherited by the 
government in 1994 faced a quadruple burden8 including HIV, Tuberculosis (TB), and 
Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS); maternal, neonatal, infant and child mortality 
and morbidity; noncommunicable diseases; and trauma and injury. In 1992/93, South Africa 
spent 6.66% of its Gross National Product (GNP) on healthcare, with 3.44% being spent in the 
private sector. The private sector was responsible for 80% of the country’s total expenditure8 
on medicines in 1990.  
Medicine in healthcare systems forms an integral part of improving healthcare in this century 
including the increase in life expectancy9. Regulating medicine pricing is a challenging and 
complex exercise but leaving a market unregulated contributes to medicine price inflation and 
lack of pricing transparency and uniformity10,11. Price control is also said to be an important 
policy instrument but very controversial12. South Africa was faced with discounts, rebates, 
medicine bonusing and price discrimination. The State alleged that these perverse incentives 
added at least 50% to the final price of the medicine12.   
The National Drug Policy (NDP) was introduced in 199613. The intention of the Government 
was to establish a pricing committee to regulate medicine prices, create transparency in the 
pricing structure from the manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor and providers of service, as 
well as to ensure a non-discriminatory pricing system through policy. The Medicines and 
Related Substance Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997, implemented on 2 May 2003, banned 
the offer of discounts and rebates to patients and healthcare providers (bonusing section 18G) 
and establishing a pricing committee (section 22G)14 moving the private sector from a free 
market15 to a regulated environment with the introduction of the Single Exit Price (SEP). The 
components of the single exit price include the ex-manufacturer price combined with the 
logistics fee (as determined by the manufacturer) and Value Added Tax (VAT)16. The SEP for 
each medicine in the market in 2004 was a mandatory declaration of the weighted average of 
all 2003 sales after taking into account all discounts and off-invoice rebates17. Further, the 1997 
amendments to the Medicines and Related Substances Act in terms of section 18A, prevented 
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pharmaceutical manufacturers from offering discounts and or rebates15. The SEP is the only 
price available in the private sector across the country before the addition of the regulated 
dispensing fee to the end-user or patient. There is an annual regulated adjustment, and the 
regulation applies to all registered medicines and schedule substances as per the Medicines Act 
except those classified in the Schedule zero category which has been specifically exempted by 
the Minister of Health from the pricing regulations14,16. The SEP regulation excludes the 
Government or public sector where a tender process applies.  
1.2. Significance of the Study  
 
Sound pharmaceutical policies contribute to a country’s  socio-economic development, and the 
country needs economic growth for healthcare systems to perform well18. Policy further 
requires long-term strategic planning, effective regulations to ensure minimizing inefficiencies 
and unnecessary mark-ups in the supply chain and best possible pricing models to ensure 
access. Government interference in medicine pricing is opposed by market economist19 who 
feel that markets should be left to its own devices, but medicine prices can determine the quality 
of life, especially for the most vulnerable.   
In attempting to regulate the market in South Africa, the government implemented various 
strategies. It is critical to look at each of these strategies to assess its impact on the intention of 
the regulator but also for any unintended consequences that may result from the various 
strategies. Pammolli et al. (2001)20 suggested that pricing mechanisms since 1990 may have 
contributed to the decline of medicine production. The implementation of the Chinese 
Medicine Policy may have resulted in a decrease of essential medicines in both the public and 
private sector between 2010 and 201221. Some countries regulate prices on the assumption that 
competition is weak in this industry22. Danzon and Chao (2000) in their study of seven 
countries found that generic competition is significant in unregulated markets (United States 
(US), United Kingdom (UK), Canada, and Germany) and that regulations undermine generic 
competition in strict regulated systems (France, Italy, Japan)22 and is counterproductive. They 
also concluded that in countries with strict regulatory systems, potential budgetary savings 
from post-patent competition are not fully realized. 
Deregulated health systems have the potential of restricting access and making medicines 
unaffordable. In the Malaysian example medicine prices were found to escalate faster than the 
prices in developed countries23. The study concluded that medicine prices in the private sector, 
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for both innovator brands and generics were high, innovator brands at high prices were 
available in the state sector with no generic equivalent, and that the availability of medicines 
even on the National Essential Drugs List (NEDL) in the state sector were low. This low 
availability of medicines in the public sector had direct impact on access as patients are forced 
into a out-of-pocket spend with affordability data suggesting that a large part of the population 
will not be able to pay.  
In the assessment by Kristina SA et al.(2020)24 in a cross-sectional study using the WHO/HAI 
methodology in Indonesia, they concluded that the availability of essential medicines in both 
the public (76.6%) and private (60.58%) was inadequate compared to the WHO standards. The 
procurement price of generic medicines in the public sector was within the reasonable range 
(0.98) while the private sector was 2.46 times the International Reference Price (IRP). The 
evidence from the study suggested that significant policy changes were required to optimise 
access to essential medicines for patients.  
The history of the Philippines medicine programme follows closely with the South African 
policy changes. The National Medicines Policy (NMP) was created in 1987 and updated in 
2008 with the addition of the Universally Assessible and Quality Medicines Act of 2008. 
Manufacturers were compelled to produce a unbranded equivalent with their branded medicine 
allowing for marketing of both medicines at the same time. The Act also allowed for the setting 
of maximum prices for medicines on their essential medicine list. The study by Batangan et al. 
(2009)25 concluded that essential medicines were only partially available in the public sector 
(53.3%) but fully available in the private sector (100%). The length of duration of stockouts in 
both sectors indicated that medicines was not continuously available. In 2009 the Philippines’s 
patients were purchasing medicines at a higher price than international reference prices (26.33 
for branded and 7.97 for generics).  
It is clear that a mix of policies are needed to make medicines more accessible and affordable. 
Further, policies must be evaluated for sustainability to ensure equity in access especially for 
the poor.  
This study, related to the SEP regulations, attempted to look at the gap between branded 
molecules and generic medicines. The World Bank (2010)26 recommended closure of the gap 
between brands and generics to assist the high cost of medicines in LMIC.  Further, the move 
towards NHI will require health technology assessment processes and this pharmacoeconomic 
evaluation forms the basis for the country’s early experience in this field. It is through this type 
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of research that we will be able to merge the strongest elements of all of our policies27 in order 
to ensure sustainable access to quality, affordable, essential medicines.  
Several global and regional initiatives including the guidelines by WHO (World Health 
Organization)5 and Health Action International (HAI)21 introduced in the past 15 years is used 
to improve medicine availability and affordability in some 50 countries internationally. This 
research uses some of these guidelines to measure and document the outcomes of policy 
changes in South Africa that may contribute to further development internally and also at the 
same time contribute to overcoming the scarcity of evidence of the impact of such policies in 
general and especially in LMIC5.  
1.3. Aims and Objectives 
 
The study aimed to assess the impact of two regulatory changes implemented in 2004 by the 
South African Government. The first being the Single Exit Price (SEP) of medicines through 
changes in the Medicine and Related Substance Act28 (2003) and the second was the 
Regulations Relating to the Ownership and Licensing of Pharmacy (GNR 553 of April 2003)29. 
The objectives of the study were as follows: 
I. To determine the impact of the regulations on the price of medicines in the short term 
and ten years after implementation for both generic and originator medicines.  
II. To determine the impact of the ownership regulation on access to community pharmacy 
in South Africa ten years after the regulation 
III. To propose recommendations if required for these policies. 
 
1.4. Research Method 
 
A literature review and empirical investigation were conducted. On the medicine pricing 
investigation, a quantitative analysis approach using a longitudinal method for pharmaceutical 
policy evaluation with a specific application of the interrupted-time series was implemented.  
The licensing policy was evaluated as a quantitative study as well, using GPS coordinates 
(QGis-V3.6) to determine opening and closures over a specified period before and after the 
implementation of the regulation.  
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1.4.1. Literature review 
The literature review used the PRIMSA30 (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews 
and Meta-Analyses) from a variety of sources including journals, books, and university on-line 
libraries but also included multiple databases search between the dates 1994–2018. It 
incorporated some technical reports from Governments and other agencies. The electronic 
database included the World Bank, the World Health Organization and the Health Action 
International. Major Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) search terms included policy, 
originator and generic/s medicines, LMIC, medicine regulations, pricing regulations, single 
exit price, pharmaceuticals, and pharmacy ownership. The review included international and 
South African literature which provided background, historical context, and international 
experiences.   
 
1.4.2. Empirical research 
A quantitative analytical approach was used. Pricing data for a basket of fifty (50) molecules 
and their generics were sourced from pharmacy computer vendors responsible for maintaining 
price files and verified via pharmacy dispensing systems spanning the period 1999 to 2014. 
Longitudinal trends using the specific application of the interrupted-time-series (ITS) were 
compared before and after the policy changes.  Stata (13 MSI), a statistical package was used 
to analyse the data, generate the necessary variables, compute the statistical analysis and 
produce the necessary graphs31. 
For the research on ownership, the South African Pharmacy Council database of all registration 
up to and including 2014 was assessed and mapped using QGIS (V3.6) and in accordance with 
population census figures for provinces and districts. 
 
1.4.3. Ethical Considerations  
The study was granted ethical clearance by the University of KwaZulu-Natal Human and 
Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (HSS/0154/013) (see Appendix A). Medicine 
pricing data was obtained from those responsible for update of price files and directly at a 
pharmacy level. Price files are not linked to patient data, are available publicly from multiple 
sources such as the National Department of Health and directly from the manufacturer of the 
products and therefore did not require signed consent. Pharmacy registration data was obtained 
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from the South African Pharmacy Council and is available to the public from the Council 
website, again needing no consent from the pharmacy themselves.  
 
 
1.5. Division of Chapters 
 
The thesis is contained in six chapters. 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a general overview of the subject matter and includes the rationale and 
significance of the study. It also provides the aims and objectives and research methodology. 
The chapter ends with the general division of the chapters in the presentation. 
Chapter 2A Literature Review (Pricing Policy) 
This chapter looks at international and local studies on pricing interventions. It provides the 
documented context for interventions around pricing policies of medicines in private pharmacy 
in South Africa.  
Chapter 2B Literature Review (Ownership) 
This chapter looks at the literature around ownership and liberalisation of pharmacy both 
nationally and internationally.  
Chapter 3 Paper 1  
Evaluating the impact of the single exit price policy on a basket of originator medicines in 
South Africa from 1999 to 2014 using a time series analysis. The study evaluates the impact 
of the SEP on a basket of originator medicines, in terms of costs, immediate price reductions 
and projected price reductions. 
 
Chapter 4 Paper 2 
The impact of the single exit price policy on a basket of generic medicines in South Africa, 
using a time series analysis from 1999 to 2014. This study assessed the impact of the Single 
Exit Price (SEP) regulation introduced in South Africa in 2004 on a basket of generic 
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medicines. The study went further to compare the difference in impact to the basket of the 
originator and generic medicines. 
Chapter 5 Paper 3 
This chapter presents the paper submitted to a journal, that evaluates the impact of opening up 
ownership of pharmacies in South Africa. 
Chapter 6 Conclusion 
This chapter reviews the outcomes of the studies in terms of both the literature review and the 
empirical data. It provides the findings of the study and the recommendation, together with 
areas for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2A LITERATURE REVIEW - MEDICINE 
PRICING 
 
2A.1 Complex nature and need for policy changes 
Nguyen TA et al. (2015)1 suggested that the complex nature of any country’s pharmaceutical 
supply chain makes it extremely sensitive to medicine pricing policy changes. It is even more 
difficult to make policy changes in LMIC where more than half and sometimes up to 90% of 
healthcare spending is out-of-pocket2. It is therefore vital that changes in policy, especially in 
LMIC be continuously monitored. The main reasons for pharmaceutical policy changes are 
due to the escalation of medicine cost worldwide, the lack of transparency in the market and 
classic market failure described by Carone G, et al. (2012)3. The per capita spending in 
pharmaceuticals investigated in Europe by Lu Y, et al. (2011)4, as per the National Health 
Accounts (NHA) reports increased by approximately 50% (n = 135–148 countries) between 
1995 and 2006. The World Health Organization (2015)5 found that medicines in LMIC 
accounted for 20-60% of the country’s healthcare budgets.  Sudan introduced a National Health 
Insurance Fund (NHIF) in 1995 and achieved national cover by 20106. Medicine expenditure 
between 2006 and 2010 in Sudan grew at an annual rate of 35.78%. This was assumed to be 
the direct result of increased utilization related to the higher coverage. Mousnad and colleagues 
(2013) further defined other multiple factors contributing to price increases, including the 
global economic crisis, increased government taxes, custom and clearance duties, and price 
increases in the exporting countries6.  Countries need to have policies in place as sound 
pharmaceutical policies contribute to a country’s socio-economic development and the 
countries need economic growth for healthcare systems to perform well7. 
 
2A.2 Types of international policy changes 
Most European Union (EU) member states (n = 24), set their prices through External Reference 
Pricing (ERP), establishing a price based on the price of the same product in other countries). 
At the same time, some countries use an Internal Reference Price (IRP) where prices are based 
on market equivalent or similar products within the country8. Vogler et al. (2011) investigated 
prices of medicines that were likely to contribute to high expenditure for the public payers in 
high-income countries9. Information on the ex-factory price data of 30 medicines in 16 
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European countries was collected in April 2013. There were considerable differences in 
medicine prices, with 53% of the medicines surveyed having a unit ex-factory price (median) 
above 200 Euro. The price differences between the highest-priced country and lowest-priced 
country ranged between 25% and 100% for two-thirds of the medicines. The mainly low-priced 
medicines had a higher price differential up to 251%8. A Nigerian national survey of 129 
medicine outlets where 34 prescription medicines were investigated showed consumers paid 
up to 64 times the international reference price10. 
Brazil in 1998 through its Federal Government implemented the Banco de Prescos em Saude 
(BPS) to facilitate a transparent measure that centralized the pricing information11. 
Schargrodsky et al. (2001) analysed the mandatory report of the purchase price in 33 hospitals 
in Buenos Aires12. The results confirmed that medicine prices significantly decreased after the 
mandatory policy, but this was not sustained, and prices eventually increased over time, an 
indication that mandatory reporting and publishing medicine prices as a policy is insufficient 
to impact on medicine price reduction. Ecuador in 201413 introduced price control for essential 
medicine which accounted for 54% of their pharmaceutical market and Colombia in 2011 
introduced a compulsory cap on inpatient drug reimbursement by active ingredient, and in 2013 
introduced an ERP using the markets in 17 countries and further regulated prices set at the 25 
percentile. A study by Prada et al. (2018)14 suggested that after implementation of direct price 
control there was a 43% decrease in price inflation, but expenditure doubled due to the 
disproportionate increase in units sold. The study concludes that pricing interventions should 
be implemented along with an active market monitoring to prevent market distortions such as 
inappropriate and unnecessary drug use14. Moreno-Torres (2011) analysed sixteen 
interventions introduced to control the pharmaceutical expenditure in Spain and found that 
twelve interventions were not effective15. Sood et al. (2009) in describing policy interventions 
in nineteen developed countries from 1992 to 2004, found that the cost reduction effects of 
price control increased the longer they remained in effect16. Introducing new policies in an 
unregulated market such as the US could significantly reduce pharmaceutical spending 
according to studies done by Abbot TA, (2007)17.  
Aitken M et al. (2016)18, suggested other methods include creating a transparent pricing system 
for medicines (a key strategic imperative of the South African National Department of Health 
(NDoH)), regulating reimbursement or dispensers, controlling wholesale and intermediaries’ 
margins, and fixing and publishing the manufacturer price of medicines. More complex 
methods include health-technology assessments to ensure cost-effectiveness of new 
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pharmaceuticals, and rational use of medicines to control public budgets18. Regulating 
pharmaceutical markets is one method used by policymakers to achieve savings. Carone, G et 
al. (2012) indicated that promoting the use of generic medicines was another cost-effective 
attempt at price control and containment3. In the WHO Guidelines on Country Pharmaceutical 
Pricing Policies 5, it is suggested that a gap exists in the quantitative assessment of the impact 
of policy change on generic medicines in LMICs. Countries enforcing a pro-generic policy 
should put in place a monitoring and evaluation programme to track data before and after a 
policy change using an experimental or quasi-experimental design so that if the policy has not 
provided the intended result, it should be reviewed. Hassali et al. (2013) recommended that the 
primary policy to promote generic medicines needs to be supported by complementary policies 
both to facilitate its implementation and also to overcome the barriers that hinder its 
effectiveness19. The policies promoting generic substitution are seen as means to contain 
pharmaceutical expenditures and are often at the forefront of yielding significant cost saving3. 
Very little is known about using pricing policies as a means to contain generic medicine prices. 
South Africa has done so, yet little published information exists regarding the impact of pricing 
policies that were implemented post-democracy. The potential for saving using generic 
medicines is huge. Cameron et al. (2012) in their study of middle to low-income countries 
concluded that or the medicines studied, an average of 9% to 89% could be saved by individual 
countries in the private sector with the change from originator to lowest-priced generics20. 
Also, the price of originator medicines internationally is two and a half (2.5) times more than 
their lowest-priced generics21.  Bangalee et al. (2016) revealed in their study on cardiovascular 
drugs a 40% difference in prices of generics against the branded versions22. This supports the 
observation by Bangalee and Suleman (2016) that originator companies do not engage in price 
competition22. Veena, et al. (2017) in India suggested that branded medicines are 30%-200% 
costlier than generics23.  
Countries like Canada cap the price at which generics enter a market as a policy option. 
Canadian provinces followed the Alberta model for the pricing of generic drugs; a model 
suggested by academics Cambourieu et al. (2013)24; Hollis A (2008)25 and Hollis A et al. 
(2015)26. In April 2014, Alberta introduced their generic policy where new generic entries start 
at 70% of the brand if there is only one generic entrant, and then subsequent generic medicines 
that entered the market were priced at 50%, 25% and 18% respectively of the originator. The 
first generic entrant keeps the advantage for one year after which the 50% price applies. The 
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savings through agreements with manufacturers using this model is expected to be $3.8 billion 
over three years to all payers26.  
Generic entry is also encouraged where there is a transparent pricing system9. It is suggested 
that countries need to examine their regulatory framework and look at trends that may limit the 
potential for savings by inadvertently encouraging higher-priced generics27. Seeley and 
Kanavos (2008) stated that the number of generic entrants is not a predictor of lower generic 
prices, but the market does need a significant number of entrants to impact the competition27. 
Each country should continue to examine the impact of its generic use policies. Vogler S 
(2012)28, and Maisonneuve et al. (2013)29, suggested that generic use can be attributed to 
countries policy implementation, e.g. a number of generics, prescribing practices and market 
structures. Strict regulation of medicine prices may contribute to lower penetration of generic 
medicines into markets30. This may be due to the reduced profitability and the inability of 
generics to cover their cost of market entry31. This is supported by Kaplan et al. (2016), who’s 
study indicates that many European countries set the price of a generic at a specific percentage 
lower than the originator product, and indicate that countries with generic link policies have 
lower prices compared to countries that do not32. 
While this chapter  focused on medicine pricing and  generic use as possible solutions, there 
are many other factors that are available to improve access to medicines. These may include 
but not be restricted to improving the medicine regulatory infrastructure to ensure accelerated 
market entry of generic and biosimilars to foster competition that improves affordability and 
ensures availability. Multiple dossiers being registered by the same manufacturer results in a 
false back log in the regulator and the ability of the manufacturer to control pricing of the  same 
molecule under different brand names. ‘Evergreening” of medicines exclusively via patents or 
extensions on existing drugs results in a restricted market for other generic entries. While it is 
imperative that a countries regulatory authority is independent, the use of reciprocal drug 
approval arrangements with other regulatory agencies may result in quick entry of both life-
saving originator medicines and cheaper generics to market. 
An improved medicine evaluation methodology, with transparency from all parties involved, 
may result in a fair price to patient and an equitable model for sustainability of the supply chain. 
This must include greater transparency in the financial flow allowing disclosure of discounts 
to pharmacy benefit managers and insurance schemes. De-linking payments on list prices of 
medicines, as is the current reimbursement model in many countries, and a move to a fixed fee 
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that supports clinical care and rewards outcomes and cost savings, will improve access and 
affordability. Consolidating the countries purchasing power, rational medicine use off a 
scientific formulary, educating both healthcare professionals and the public and supporting a 
marketing code with implementable sanctions are import tools available to support 
affordability and availability of medicines43. 
 
2A.3 Pharmaceutical changes in South Africa 
In South Africa, as in many parts of the world, affordability is a barrier to gaining33 access to 
quality pharmaceutical therapies. Council for Medical Schemes (CMS) in South Africa 
indicated that medicine expenditure was the main cost driver in the 1980s and early 1990’s 
peaking at 31.8% of the total medical scheme spend in 199934. The South African Governments 
pre-1994, led several attempts to regulate the medicine-pricing environment, in terms of 
changes to the Medicines and Related Substances Act35,36. The introduction of the pricing 
regulations  in South Africa created an ideal platform for pricing transparency, a concept that 
Vogler S, (2011) agreed can contribute to affordable patient access to medicines9. The SEP 
attempted to control medicine prices at the manufacturer level, a common strategy in price 
control policies seen in most European Union countries37 where authorities set the price on a 
regulatory basis.  
In 1996 the Government introduced the National Drug Policy38 outlining among other policies, 
the intention to establish a pricing committee to regulate medicine prices, create transparency 
in the pricing structure from the manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor and providers of service, 
as well as to ensure a non-discriminatory pricing system. The Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 199735, implemented on 2 May 2003, banned the 
offer of discounts and rebates to patients and healthcare providers (bonusing section 18A and 
B), made provision for ethical marketing of pharmaceuticals (18C), introduced generic 
substitution (22F) and established a pricing committee (section 22G). The pricing committee 
made recommendations to the Minister of Health to implement the SEP22 in 2004, effectively 
moving the private sector from a free market to a regulated environment.  
The components of the single exit price include the ex-manufacturer price combined with the 
logistics fee (as determined by the manufacturer) and Value Added Tax (VAT)39. The SEP for 
each medicine in the market in 2004 was a mandatory declaration of the weighted average of 
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all 2003 sales after taking into account all discounts and off-invoice rebates40. In effect, the 
manufacturer listed their price and could only sell at that specified price to their customers41, 
although they were allowed to apply to the NDOH to make price reductions for reasons such 
as competition, reduction in exchange rates or overstock stock issues. The NDOH through the 
pricing committee determines an annual increase based on a number of factors; the average 
Consumer Price Index (CPI), average Producer Price Index (PPI), Exchange rates, and 
Purchaser Power Parity (PPP), international pricing information relating to medicines and 
schedule-substances, comments received from interested persons (Reg 8(2)), and the need to 
ensure availability, affordability, and quality of medicines42. 
 
2A.4 Summary  
While the pharmaceutical supply chain in any country is complex in nature, it requires constant 
monitoring and review by the regulators to ensure the best possible outcomes for the patient. 
The escalating medicine costs, lack of transparency, and the world-wide shift towards universal 
healthcare coverage has created an opportunity for each country to examine its pharmaceutical 
pricing policies and align it to international best practices.  
It is clear from the literature review that there are many options available for setting of medicine 
prices and in most instances, a country may choose multiple policies interventions. Some may 
produce immediate gains and also show long term benefit for the duration of its implementation 
while other may have unintended and unforeseen detrimental consequences, especially so in 
LMIC where a vast majority of patients are faced with out-of-pocket payments.   
South Africa chose to implement a transparent pricing system regulating medicines at a 
manufacturer level (SEP) and capping the fee related to any added professional service 
(Dispensing Fee).  We also saw the added benefit of allowing for medicine interchangeability. 
After ten years of implementation it is important that these critical interventions are examined 
to determine its value to the country. 
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CHAPTER 2B LITERATURE REVIEW- PHARMACY 
OWNERSHIP 
 
2B.1 Background 
In most European Union (EU)  countries pharmacy is highly regulated1. Countries follow 
various routes of regulation in the establishment of community pharmacy depending on their 
expected needs. The common thread that runs through most highly regulated environments is 
the basic principle of autonomy of the pharmacist. This includes  their clinical decisions 
making skills, the maintaining of ethical standards related to being healthcare professionals, 
and the issue of their social accountability not being overridden by economic interest associated 
with either ownership or market forces related to their employment2. There are also broader 
restrictions in terms of a positive and negative list of who can and cannot own a pharmacy, the 
most prevalent being medical doctors, pharmaceutical wholesalers and manufacturers of 
pharmaceuticals2.  In LMIC pharmacy legislation and regulations are fragmented, and it is 
difficult for Governments to enforce these limited regulations due to resource constraints3.  
The International Pharmaceutical Federation (FIP) 2016,  suggests that pharmacy finds itself 
at the crossroads between professionalism, accountability, professional autonomy and 
economic policy2 and policy determination in most countries is dependent on where the country 
places its emphasis.  This is supported by the view of Brazeau GA et al. (2009) that 
contemporary pharmacy education is strengthened by growth and enhancement in the clinical, 
social and administrative science of pharmacy giving practitioners the skills and knowledge to 
move from a product focus to patient-centred care4. This has resulted in graduates of pharmacy 
being refocused on patient-centred care, interprofessional teams, evidence-based practice, 
quality improvements and use of information4. Policy determination within a country must 
provide for these independent practitioners to pursue this unlimited professional practice role 
that can transform the health of a nation. Medicines involve compelling economic interest as 
50% of household expenditure on health in developing countries is medicines and is also the 
second largest spend in government health budgets behind salaries. In industrial nations drug 
costs increase by 8-12% annually5. It is therefore imperative that pharmaceutical policies deal 
with the principles and meets its goal of contributing to overall health, welfare and well-being 
of society6.  
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Almarsdottir AB et al. (2006) identified vital goals in policy making such as  (a) maximizing 
access to medicines; (b) ensuring quality of medicinal products; (c) minimizing costs related 
to medicines and healthcare use, and (d) promoting rational use of medicines through prudent 
use of the healthcare workforce and warned that these goals may be conflictual6.  In most 
countries where deregulation was attempted the rationale for change centred around7 need for 
increased competition, containment of pharmaceutical expenditure, improved access to 
pharmaceutical care and improved opening of new outlets in areas of need.  
 
2B.2 International Review 
Community pharmacy is a critical part of pharmaceutical service delivery in many countries. 
Principle areas of practice in Europe are 78.5% in community, 8.9% in hospital and 12.6% in 
other areas8. The survey conducted by International Pharmaceutical Federation  (FIP 2016) in 
71 countries covering 80% of the world’s population indicated that 66% of pharmacy 
ownership is non-exclusive to pharmacists alone and the balance of 34% (24 countries) was 
exclusive2. The Österreichisches Bundesinstitut für Gesundheitswesen (OBIG 2006)7 report of 
the European Union countries indicated that 17 of the 25 member nations operated restricted 
ownership of pharmacies. The study showed a steady increase in the number of pharmacies in 
the deregulated states accompanied by urban clustering and fewer municipalities having access 
to service.  Wisell K et al. (2015) found that Sweden operated state-owned community 
pharmacies since 1971 and only liberalised ownership in 2009 where the sector is currently 
dominated by chains and independents with one or a few pharmacies per owner9. The authors 
noted that the rationale for the deregulation was focused on price pressure, efficiency and better 
usage of medicine but was replaced with diversity in the market and entrepreneurship with the  
privatisation concepts not set out as the initial goals9. Liberalisation in the UK10, on the other 
hand, is said to have made the system more efficient in operational terms. The authors’ further 
stated that because the pharmacy, as in South Africa, is under the supervision of the pharmacist, 
quality issues should not be a concern. Lluch and Kanavos1(2010)  raised the concern of the 
risk associated with chains and vertical integration which may lead to forms of monopoly and 
suggests that policies addressing these risks should be considered. The authors concluded that 
restricting ownership does not have an impact on access (positive or negative).  The opposite 
may lead to efficiencies in terms of economies of scale through vertical integration, but the 
liberal ownership and the consequent vertical and horizontal integration embeds risk of 
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oligopoly creating disincentives in the future1.  
Mossialos and Mrazek11 (2003) looked at community pharmacy ownership in six OECD 
countries, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway and the United States. Four 
countries with the exception of France and Germany allowed corporate ownership while these 
two countries restrict ownership to a registered pharmacist and impose a further restriction 
where a pharmacist is allowed to own only one pharmacy. A 1963 state law in the US restricting 
ownership to pharmacists or groups of pharmacists was tested via the North Dakota Pharmacy 
Ownership Initiative12 in November 2014 where a chain pharmacy group attempted to have the 
law repealed and lost in a public referendum. It was shown that across every key measure of 
pharmacy care including prescription prices, levels of patient care and most importantly, rural 
access, North Dakota13 outperformed other states. Two other countries, Hungary (2009) and 
Estonia (2015)14, returned to regulated ownership based on the impact on professional 
independence of the pharmacists, lack of improvement in rural areas, and the poor financial 
viability of the remaining pharmacies.  The North Dakota ruling was supported by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling in May 2009 which ruled that, while restrictions on 
ownership and operation of pharmacies constitute a restriction on the freedom of establishment 
and the free movement of capital, these restrictions can be justified, and the EU Member States’ 
national legislation may restrict pharmacy ownership and operation to persons having the status 
of a pharmacist15,16. 
Burton S et al. (2019)17 found that in Africa, some countries such as Chad, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Côte d’ Ivoire, and Cameroon restrict ownership to pharmacists only while Kenya followed 
the South African model of ownership. Countries with pro-competitive policies often driven 
by competition authorities sometimes drive deregulation. Deregulation in most countries 
results in corporatisation of community pharmacy17,18,19. There is also the mixed-ownership 
type where ownership must include the pharmacists but may include other non-pharmacists or 
corporates as shareholders. Pharmacist majority shareholding in these entities is seen in 
Austria, Cyprus and Latvia (51% minimum) with Lithuania and Spain having a 75% 
shareholding17. 
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2B.3 South Africa 
The study focused on medicine distribution legislation that went into effect in 2004 related to 
the liberalisation of pharmacy ownership. The main goal was to look at the issue of access to 
medicines, but it is essential to interrogate the main arguments presented to parliament before 
the legislation. The National Drug Policy (1996)20 outlined the plan to liberalise ownership of 
pharmacy – where it is deemed to be in the interest of the public and provided that 
comprehensive pharmaceutical care is ensured, ownership of pharmacies by lay-persons and 
other healthcare professionals will be considered. Further to the issue related to access, it was 
stated that medical practitioners and nurses would not be permitted to dispense drugs, except 
where separate pharmaceutical services are not available. Extensive debate took place in 
parliament with motivation for the ruling party the African National Congress (ANC) in 199721. 
It was noted that black pharmacists21 who qualified in the ‘80s and early ‘90s were not allowed 
to own pharmacies in urban areas. Opening up of ownership would reduce the price of 
medicines, promote healthy competition and create more jobs.  Various cautions were raised 
in the process of the debate21. 
• Regulations made in terms of Section 14 be very carefully drafted.  
• Secondly, the ruling party specified that the authority given to the Director-General of 
Health is a policy decision to ensure that pharmacy outlets open in communities where 
they are most needed.  
• Concern was raised about the suffocation of small business and the development of 
monopolies.  
On 22 October 1997 the African National Congress22 publication outlined its motivation in 
support of the Bill: 
• To increase the number of outlets able to dispense medicines to improve public 
access. 
• To increase competition which should reduce prices to consumers. 
• To increase job opportunities amongst pharmacists and pharmacy assistants. 
• Increase opportunities for emerging entrepreneurs to establish pharmacies in 
historically disadvantaged areas.  
 
The document further stated that the Health Minister is extending access to pharmacy services 
by ‘breaking up the pharmacist’s monopoly over ownership” and that South Africa will get the 
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same access to pharmacy services as is enjoyed by people in Britain, America and many other 
countries. The Regulations Relating to the Ownership and Licensing of Pharmacies (sec 22 & 
22A of the Pharmacy Act, 1974 (Act No. 53 of 1974) was published in GNR. 553 of 25 April 
200323. 
Early findings by Ward K et a. (2014) in South Africa supported the international findings that 
deregulation did not improve access in rural and areas of need but saw substantial corporate 
growth concentrated in urban and economic hubs with a decline of the provision in terms of 
pharmacy to population ratio in rural communities24.  
 
2B.4 Rural Access 
Mossialos and Mrazek11 (2003) in their report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading found 
that  most countries, like South Africa, move to open ownership with the view to improving 
rural access, however very few countries achieve this goal11,15. Rural Canada, Netherlands and 
South Africa allow physicians to dispense to ensure access to medicines in these areas. Norway 
maintains an operational subsidy for pharmacies to expand in rural areas.  Germany provides 
no direct subsidy but makes an exception to the single pharmacy ownership rule, allowing 
owners to open a second pharmacy provided it is in remote areas. The Netherlands does not 
impose restriction on location but may control the location in terms of the offer of contract with 
the principle insurer (the State). This is further supported by the fact that banks will provide 
loans to the opening of new pharmacies based on the holding of these contracts11.  
 
2B.5 Summary  
It is clear that the pharmacy profession is at a crossroad between professional accountability, 
professional autonomy and economic policy. The emphasis placed on each of these elements 
may be different in various countries depending on the needs of the policy makers. Pharmacists 
see themselves as an extension of the healthcare  system providing an essential public service 
irrespective of where they perform their professional skills.  
The literature indicates that countries may choose various models of pharmacy ownership from 
those restricted to ownership by the pharmacist, pharmacies owned by the state, to complete 
ownership by non-pharmacists at the other end of the spectrum.  Further restriction may be 
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imposed on different models of ownership from attempting to encourage rural access with 
incentives, preventing clustering by imposing population or distance perimeters, to limiting 
number of pharmacies that an entity can own to prevent monopolies. Most attempts at 
deregulation focused on price pressure, efficiency and better usage of medicine but ultimately 
gets replaced with diversity in the market and entrepreneurship with the  privatisation concepts 
not set out as the initial goals. Concerns raised in many markets after liberalisation related to 
monopoly or oligopoly on the entry of corporations to own. Some prevented this eventuality 
by placing limitation on the horizontal and vertical integration of these entities.  
Countries that did not meet their policy goals upon re-examination,  moved back from 
liberalization to restricted ownership, putting ownership of pharmacies back into the hands of 
the pharmacists.  
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CHAPTER 3 PAPER 1 
 
3.1 Evaluating the impact of the single exit price policy on a basket of originator 
medicines in South Africa from 1999 to 2014 using a time series analysis 
This chapter addresses the objective outlined in Chapter 1 related to a comparative of medicine 
prices before and after regulations, evaluate the impact on the prices of medicines immediately 
after regulations and then ten years after regulations, for originator medicines. The empirical 
findings are based on the analysis of the Single Exit Price (SEP) observed over a period of 16 
years (1999-2014).   
 
The Paper, entitled “Evaluating the impact of the single exit price policy on a basket of 
originator medicines in South Africa from 1999 to 2014 using a time series analysis” has 
been published in the “BMC Health Service Research”. 
 
Reference: Moodley & Suleman (2019) Evaluating the impact of the single exit price policy 
on a basket of originator medicines in South Africa from 1999 to 2014 using a time series 
analysis BMC Health Services Research (2019) 19:576.  
(https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-019-4403-8) 
 
The databases for the research were obtained from Pharmacies and Computer Vendors. The 
Ethics certificate can be found in Annexure A. This chapter presents the published paper as per 
the journal stipulated format and limitations in terms of graphs, tables and word count. 
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CHAPTER 4 PAPER 2 
 
4.1 The impact of the single exit price policy on a basket of generic medicines in South Africa, 
using a time series analysis from 1999 to 2014 
This chapter addresses one objective outlined in Chapter 1 related to a comparison of medicine 
prices before and after regulations, evaluate the impact on the prices of medicines immediately 
after regulations and then ten years after regulations, for generic medicines. The empirical 
findings are based on the analysis of the Single Exit Price (SEP) observed over a period of 16 
years (1999-2014).   
 
The Paper, entitled “The impact of the single exit price policy on a basket of generic 
medicines in South Africa, using a time series analysis from 1999 to 2014” has been 
published in the “PLoS ONE 14(7): e0219690”. 
 
Reference: Moodley & Suleman (2019) The impact of the single exit price policy on a basket 
of generic medicines in South Africa, using a time series analysis from 1999 to 2014 
PLoS ONE 14(7): e0219690. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal. pone.0219690  
Published: July 31, 2019 
 
The databases for the research were obtained from Pharmacies and Computer Vendors. The 
Ethics certificate can be found in Annexure A. This chapter presents the published paper as per 
the journal stipulated format and limitations in terms of graphs, tables and word count. 
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CHAPTER 5 PAPER 3 
 
5.1 To evaluate the impact of opening up ownership of pharmacies in South Africa  
To evaluate the impact of opening up ownership of pharmacies in South Africa.  
This chapter explored the impact of liberalization of the pharmacy regulations on rural 
access, ownership, and on existing community pharmacies in South Africa before and 
after the introduction of the regulation.  
The Paper, entitled “To evaluate the impact of opening up ownership of pharmacies in 
South Africa” has been sent for publication to the “BMC Health Services Research”. 
The databases for the research was obtained from the South African Pharmacy Council.  
The Ethics certificate can be found in Annexure A. 
This chapter presents the published paper as per the journal stipulated format and 
limitations in terms of graphs, tables and word count. 
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Abstract 20 
 21 
Background 22 
Following the democratic elections in 1994 the South African private pharmaceutical services were 23 
mostly urban and metropolitan centred with a scattering of pharmacies in small towns and rural 24 
communities. The Government introduced regulations relating to the ownership and licensing of 25 
pharmacies on the 25th of April 2003 to improve access to pharmaceutical services by removing 26 
ownership restriction to only pharmacists. 27 
 28 
Objective 29 
To assess the outcomes of the policy implementation in improving access to pharmacies 30 
 31 
Method:  32 
The register of pharmacies at the South African Pharmacy Council was analysed from 1994 to 2014.  33 
Each registration was assigned GPS coordinates using Q-GIS(V3.6) and mapped per province at a district 34 
level, following clean-up and verification of the register. New registrations were also categorised as 35 
either corporate or independent pharmacy. Population census was obtained from Statistics South Africa 36 
and used to determine the number of pharmacies per 100 000 population.  37 
 38 
Main Outcome Measure(s):  39 
Number of active pharmacies; Number of independent pharmacies; number of pharmacies in each district 40 
 41 
Results:  42 
The number of active pharmacies increased from 1624 at the end of 2003 to 3021 by 2014. The closure 43 
rate decreased from 137 to 86 pharmacies per year post regulations, a 37.23 % reduction with a net gain 44 
of approximately 127 pharmacies per year. About 38.30% of all pre-2003 pharmacies (622 of 1624) 45 
closed by 2014.  The population increase in the study period was approximately 20.66% but the overall 46 
growth of pharmacies was only 1.88 pharmacies per 100 000 population (3.55 to 5.43). Following the 47 
regulations in 2004, 23.9% of pharmacies active within the system closed between 2004-2014, of which, 48 
91.7% of them were independent pharmacies.  49 
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 3 
 50 
Conclusion:  51 
Opening up of pharmacy ownership in South Africa increased the number of pharmacies in the country 52 
but did not result in increased access in previously disadvantaged and rural  areas. There was still urban 53 
clustering of pharmacies, with a steady growth in corporate pharmacy (35%) ownership.   54 
 55 
Key Words: 56 
Ownership, South Africa, Liberalisation, Medicine Access, Pharmacy, Ownership 57 
 58 
Impact of findings on practice statements  59 
1. Opening up ownership of pharmacies to non-pharmacists may not result in a large 60 
increase in pharmacy access in previously disadvantaged and rural areas 61 
2. Policymakers need to consider other incentives to improve access in underserved areas. 62 
3. Policymakers should monitor implementation of the policy to avoid monopolies being 63 
developed 64 
  65 
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 4 
Introduction 66 
Following the 1994 democratic elections the new Government in South Africa had the opportunity to 67 
introduce policies that ensured the availability and accessibility of cost-effective medicines to all South 68 
Africans. A National Pharmaceutical Policy Committee was established by the Government post 69 
elections in April 1994 [1], which led to the publication of the National Drug Policy [2]. The key concept 70 
related to pharmacy ownership was contained in the following statement; “Where it is deemed to be in 71 
the interests of the public, and provided that comprehensive pharmaceutical care is ensured, ownership 72 
of pharmacies by laypersons and other health care professionals will be considered [2].”  73 
 74 
It is important to reflect on the intention of the Minister in introducing the Bill to parliament in 1997 for 75 
debate. Black pharmacists [3] who qualified in the 80’s and early 90’s were not allowed to own 76 
pharmacies in urban areas where trade was lucrative and profitable. Private pharmaceutical services were 77 
only accessible to affluent communities situated in metropolitan areas [4]. The Bill sought to improve 78 
access to pharmaceutical services by removing restriction of ownership to only pharmacists. Further 79 
debate centred around the Minister’s powers in determining who should own pharmacies, and ownership 80 
being determined on a need basis. Part of the motivation heard in parliament [3] was that opening up of 81 
ownership would reduce the price of medicines, promote healthy competition and create more jobs.  82 
 83 
The Regulations Relating to the Ownership and Licensing of Pharmacies was published in GNR. 553 of 84 
25 April 2003 [5] where the responsibility to issue a license was moved from the South African Pharmacy 85 
Council to the National Department of Health. Unlike many low income countries where pharmacy 86 
oversight, regular inspection and law enforcement is weak [6], the South African Pharmacy Council has 87 
a well-defined and stringent process.  88 
 89 
In most countries where deregulation was attempted, the rationale for change centred around the need 90 
for increased competition, containment of pharmaceutical expenditure, improved access to 91 
pharmaceutical care and opening of new outlets in areas of need [7]. The Österreichisches Bundesinstitut 92 
für Gesundheitswesen Austrian Health Institute (OBIG) 2006 report [7] of the European Union (EU) 93 
countries indicated that 17 of the 25 member nations operated restricted ownership of pharmacies. The 94 
study went further to do a comparative analysis of three EU countries that were regulated i.e. Austria, 95 
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 5 
Finland and Spain compared to the deregulated states of Ireland, Netherlands and Norway.  The study 96 
showed a strong increase in the number of pharmacies in the deregulated member states accompanied by 97 
urban clustering and fewer municipalities having access to service.  98 
 99 
A 2015 survey conducted by the International Pharmaceutical Federation (FIP) [8] in 71 countries 100 
covering 80% of the world’s population indicated that 66% of pharmacy ownership is non-exclusive to 101 
pharmacists and the balance of 34% (24 countries) were exclusive. Non pharmacist ownership ranged 102 
from state ownership to complete liberalisation. Other factors that determined ownership related to 103 
workforce capacity where the number of pharmacists may not be sufficient to cover the areas of need. 104 
Some countries have liberalisation but provide additional restrictions [8], the most frequent being 105 
restricting other authorized non-pharmacist prescribers from ownership,  banning vertical integration in 106 
a supply chain, or restricting horizontal integration to prevent dominance. Strong regulated environments 107 
are built on restricted ownership to pharmacists, combined with geographic conditions [9] based on 108 
number of inhabitants per pharmacy and minimum distance from each other.  This is meant to create a 109 
spread of pharmacies across geographic areas allowing for sustainability.  110 
 111 
Challenges of restrictive ownership in Germany and Italy were brought to the European Court of Justice 112 
[8]. The court ruled that restriction with the justification of safety and quality is allowed. Two other 113 
countries, Hungary (2009) and Estonia (2015) [10], returned to regulated ownership based on 114 
professional independence of the pharmacists, lack of rural improvement, and financial unviability of the 115 
remaining pharmacies. In Africa, some countries such as Chad, Senegal, and Cameroon restrict 116 
ownership to pharmacists while Kenya and Nigeria, follow the South African model of liberal ownership. 117 
Countries with pro-competitive policies driven by competition authorities often drive deregulation [11].   118 
 119 
In countries where ownership is exclusive to pharmacists [8] there is an understanding that community 120 
pharmacists form an extension of the healthcare system and provide an essential public service. These 121 
models exist extensively in Africa, Eastern Mediterranean, Australia and Europe. Multiple models of 122 
open ownership and restricted ownership in the United States (US) exist as in the case of South and North 123 
Dakota respectively. A 1963 state law restricting ownership to pharmacists was tested via the North 124 
Dakota Pharmacy Ownership Initiative [12] in November 2014 where a chain pharmacy group attempted 125 
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 6 
to have the law repealed and lost in a public referendum.  It was shown that across every key measure of 126 
pharmaceutical care including prescription prices, levels of patient care and most importantly rural 127 
access, North Dakota outperformed other states [13].  128 
 129 
Other models of ownership which include non-governmental organisations, charities, religious groups 130 
and humanitarian organisations [8] are found in 28% of countries surveyed in a study by the Federation 131 
of International Pharmacy (FIP). Brazil has a unique model of municipal owned community pharmacies 132 
(Farmacias Populares do Brasil) [8] dispensing medicines off their essential medicine lists and employing 133 
pharmacists.  Since 2009 when Sweden liberalised pharmacy ownership the sector is dominated by 134 
chains and independents [10]. The  rationale for the deregulation which included pricing, efficiency and 135 
usage of medicine were replaced by diversity, entrepreneurship and privatisation goals [10]. 136 
 137 
Aim of Study 138 
The aim of this research was to explore the impact of opening up of ownership on rural access and 139 
ownership type before and after the introduction of the regulation in South Africa.  140 
 141 
Methods 142 
Although licenses are granted by the National Department of Health since 2004, service can only be 143 
activated with a SAPC certificate of registration. Thus an analysis of the South African Pharmacy 144 
Council registers for the period 1994 to 2014 was conducted.  The register data was cleaned and 145 
allocation was done in terms of provinces. A verification process involving reconciling register records 146 
with Medpages[14] followed by random telephone sampling was conducted. GPS coordinates were 147 
assigned using Q-GIS (V3.6) before mapping at a district level. Population census to determine 148 
pharmacies per 100 000 population was obtained from Statistics South Africa (StatsSA)[15]. Opening 149 
and closures of pharmacies through the study period was recorded.  Both district and municipal 150 
information was sourced from the Municipal Demarcation Board[16]. Community pharmacies were 151 
classified and mapped as independent and corporate, and compared to the pre-2004 data.  152 
 153 
Results:  154 
 155 
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Insert Table 1 here 156 
 157 
The number of active pharmacies (Table 1) increased from 1624 in 2003 to 3021 in 2014.  The closure 158 
rate reduced from 137 per year pre 2004 to 86 per year post regulations, a 37.23 % reduction, gaining 159 
127 pharmacies per year. The net gain was largest in Gauteng (39.51%) with Eastern Cape (1.93%), 160 
Northern Cape (1.36%), Free State (5.08%) , North West (8.02%) and Mpumalanga (7.30%) showing 161 
increases in the number  of new pharmacies. Of the pharmacies that were open in 2004 (Pre-2003 162 
pharmacies) 38,30% (622 of 1624) were closed by 2014.  163 
The census indicated a population growth of 20.66% but pharmacies grew by only 1.88 pharmacies per 164 
100 000 population (3.55 to 5.43). Pharmacies have continued to close during the identified study period 165 
(2004-2014) as follows: 622 of the pre 2003 registrations, 43 corporate and 284 independents registered 166 
post 2003; 23.9% of active pharmacies closed between 2004-2014 of which 91.7% were independent 167 
pharmacies.  168 
Most provinces show a similar percentage closure of new pharmacies (2004-2014)  – Western Cape 169 
(14%), Gauteng (16.6%), Kwa Zulu Natal (14.1%), Free State (13.9%), and Mpumalanga (14.4%). The 170 
more rural provinces such as the Eastern Cape (3.4%), North West (9.0%) and Limpopo (7.7%) showed 171 
a lower closure rate with the Northern Cape being most affected as 31% of new pharmacies closed within 172 
the study period.  173 
 174 
Insert Table 2 here  175 
 176 
From Table 2, it can be seen that Manguang district in the Free State showed a substantial increase in the 177 
number of pharmacies from 19 (2004) to 47 (2014). The majority are located in densely populated areas. 178 
Increases in all other districts remained low with the Xhariep district having only 5 pharmacies by 2014. 179 
Little or no improvement was  seen in the sparsely populated rural settlements.  180 
 181 
In Kwa-Zulu Natal most districts in Quintile 1 had marginal increases in numbers of pharmacies. The 182 
Umgungundlovu district increased by 42 pharmacies post regulation with a total of 65 located mostly 183 
within the city centre. This may be due to it being the second most populated district in the province, 184 
having both a Deprivation Index(D/I) of 2.28 and placed in Quintile 3. Despite an increase of 16 to 32 185 
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 8 
pharmacies in the Ugu district, access did not improve as new pharmacies were located where access 186 
already existed. The Ethekwini Municipality showed an improvement with most pharmacies located 187 
within or close to existing pharmacies (3.95 to 7.37 per 100 000). Kwa Zulu Natal improved marginally 188 
from 3.45 to 5.43 per 100 000 population indicating the lack of growth in the rural area. The number of 189 
active pharmacies in the province increased from 315 in 2003 to 340 by 2014. In the same period 156 190 
pharmacies closed (108  pre 2003 and 48 post 2003 registrations) 191 
 192 
The Mpumalanga province showed the most improvement: Ehlanzeni (16 to 67), Nkangala (31 to 63) 193 
and Gert Sibanda (32 to 51). All three districts have large populations and are classified in Quintiles 3 194 
and 4. There has been growth both in the city and regional service centres as well as in the populated 195 
rural areas especially in Ehlanzeni. The province started from a low base of 2.53 per 100 000 population 196 
and improved to 4.71 per 100 000.  197 
 198 
Limpopo province grew by 13% and showed the best new pharmacy growth (10.67%)  gaining 199 
approximately 13 pharmacies per year. All districts showed improvement in the number of pharmacies 200 
in both city and densely populated rural areas. Most districts have a large population base of over a 201 
million persons. The Capricorn district improved from 1.56 to 3.98 pharmacies per 100 000. Overall, the 202 
province saw an improvement from 1.14 to 3.55 pharmacies per 100 000 population.  While new 203 
pharmacies showed a comparatively low closure rate (7.7%), the combined closure of pre and post 2003 204 
pharmacies was 13.45% between 2004-2014. 205 
 206 
The North West district of Bojanale with a population of 1.66 million people showed a marked increase 207 
in the number of pharmacies post 2003 growing from 21 to 80 active pharmacies in 2014 with a growth 208 
from 1.76 to 4.83 per 100 000 population. The Dr Kenneth Kaunda district also showed improvement 209 
from 21 to 55 pharmacies primarily  in the urban centres. The North West province gained a net of 10 210 
pharmacies per year since the regulations growing from 1.99 to 4.62 per 100 000 population.  211 
 212 
Three districts in the Gauteng province (Tshwane 221, Ekurhuleni 159, and City of Johannesburg 321) 213 
showed a large increase in number of new pharmacies. The data indicates an increase in the number of 214 
pharmacies per 100 000 population (Tshwane 4.08 to 9.22, Ekurhuleni 3.16 to 7.28, City of Johannesburg 215 
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 9 
3.34 to 8.67).  The smaller districts such as Sedibeng (3.1 to 6.06) and Westrand (2.1 to 5.24) also showed 216 
increases. The province moved from 5.52 to 7.99 per 100 000 population.  The rate of closure of 217 
pharmacies was 25.1% between 2004 to 2014 with new pharmacies experiencing a lower closure rate of 218 
16.6% compared to a 39.8% closure rate from the pre 2003 pharmacies showing a reduction from a 527 219 
in 2004 to 317 in 2014.  220 
 221 
The Northern Cape showed a marginal increase from  3.25 to 4.27 per 100 000 with none of the districts 222 
showing significant increases. Frances Baard showed a slight improvement from 2.76 to 5.42 per 100 000 223 
population although 33.3% of new pharmacies that opened after regulations closed by 2014. There was 224 
low growth of 1.73 pharmacies per year contributing marginally (1.36%) to the overall growth of 225 
pharmacies in South Africa with 31% of all new pharmacies closing during the period 2004 to 2014.    226 
  227 
Pharmacies that were registered pre -2003 in the Eastern Cape districts of Alfred Nzo and OR Tambo all 228 
closed by 2014 with only 9 and 19 respectively still active post 2003 registrations . The economic hubs 229 
of Nelson Mandela Bay and Buffalo City showed improvement in the cities and large regional centres 230 
increasing from 3.9 to 7.52 and 1.85 to 5.27 respectively per 100 000 population. The closure of new 231 
pharmacies in the Eastern Cape was low at 3.4% (5 of 147). By 2014 56.0% of active pharmacies in 2004 232 
had closed leaving the province with 229 pharmacies in 2014 (87 +142).   233 
 234 
Western Cape increased from 5.77 to 9.55 per 100 000 population with the City of Cape Town showing 235 
a marked improvement of 3.8 to 7.59 per 100 000 population mostly in the city and large regional centres. 236 
Also evident was the dominance of corporate pharmacy (150 new openings) compared to 144 237 
independents. The Central Karoo and Overberg area showed little improvement with other districts 238 
improving only marginally. The province showed an average attrition rate of new pharmacies of 14%. 239 
Approximately 66.37% of new pharmacies opened in the City of Cape Town with the bulk of the balance 240 
being shared between Eden (12.7%) and the Cape Winelands (11.7%).  241 
 242 
A summary of all the active pharmacies per province in 2014 (3021) is presented in Table 3 below. Of 243 
these, 2019 pharmacies (66.8%) opened after the regulation with Gauteng, Western Cape and Kwa Zulu 244 
Natal showing the most new openings.  245 
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 246 
Insert Table 3 here 247 
 248 
Discussion 249 
The increase in the number of pharmacies post regulations from 1624 in 2004 to 3021 in 2014 (Table 3) 250 
is in keeping with the OBIG 2006 European [7] study which showed that there was an increase in the 251 
number of pharmacies in countries that had introduced liberalisation. Norway has 8500 [18] inhabitants 252 
per pharmacy with the regulated Spain (2050) and Austria (3700). Ireland, a deregulated zone has 3000 253 
inhabitants per pharmacy . South Africa moved from 28 000 to 18 000 inhabitants per pharmacy, short 254 
of the acceptable international standards.    255 
 256 
Most growth of new pharmacies occurred in Gauteng, Kwa Zulu Natal and Western Cape. These 257 
provinces contain the major metropolitan areas; Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, , City of Johannesburg; 258 
Ethekwini; and City of Cape Town. These five large districts obtained 52% of all new pharmacies. This 259 
urban clustering and lack of improvement in rural areas is in keeping with local [4,11] and international 260 
[7,8] study findings.  Areas with the highest deprivation had fewer pharmacies per 100 000 population. 261 
Within the framework of current legislation South Africa must find a way to incentivise the opening of 262 
pharmacies in areas of need.  263 
 264 
After Norway’s [7] deregulation in 2001 every second municipality had no pharmacy. Urban clustering, 265 
vertical integration and chain ownership by wholesalers resulted in   4 of 5 pharmacies  being owned by 266 
1 of 3 chains. Pharmacists own only 19% of Norwegian pharmacies. The Norwegian experience led 267 
researchers to believe that deregulation leads to market dominance and minimises competition. Principle 268 
areas of practice in Europe are 78.5% in community, 8.9% in hospital and 12.6% in other areas [19]. In  269 
South Africa 68.3% of registered pharmacists practiced in the community sector in 2014 [20]. Any 270 
regulation must be carefully monitored to ensure stability and job security in this market. Deregulation 271 
in most countries [11] results in corporatisation of community pharmacy. In South Africa following 272 
deregulation 35% of new pharmacies were corporate listed. Similarly, Norway (96%), Sweden (86%), 273 
US (64%), and UK (61%) showed dominance of corporatisation post deregulation [11,21].  274 
 275 
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In Sweden the Agency for Growth Policy Analysis (Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communication) 276 
found that after deregulation, new pharmacies opened in urban and not rural areas, and the price of over-277 
the-counter medicines did not decrease [22]. Lluch and Kanavos [23] highlighted the  risk associated 278 
with chains and vertical integration leading  to monopoly. Policies addressing these risks should be 279 
considered.  280 
 281 
The study does have limitations. The pharmaceutical service per population ratio is only reflective for 282 
community pharmacy and excludes the public sector. The type of ownership was restricted to 283 
independent and corporate pharmacy only. The primary source document which was the Council register 284 
had inaccuracies as well as insufficient ownership data. The study did not look into quality of service 285 
provided, or operational efficiencies. 286 
 287 
Future research should include investigating:  288 
• means of improving “rural policy, rural health services and rural practice [24]” 289 
• The cost implication of  the disruption of existing pharmacies in terms of capital and 290 
infrastructure loss 291 
• the implications of concentration of pharmacy staff within the same location for service delivery 292 
in areas of need   293 
• the long term impact on pharmacy skills development as new pharmacists are forced into  294 
prematurely taking on responsible pharmacist roles [10,25] 295 
• the overall cost of pharmaceutical care in respect of duplication as opposed  to rationalization of 296 
resources  297 
• benchmark indicators of accessibility, quality and expenditure, which ranks better in strict 298 
regulated environments than in the non-regulated countries [13]   299 
 300 
Conclusions 301 
While liberalisation laws in South Africa may have increased the number of pharmacies, it did not result 302 
in a large increase in pharmacy access in previously disadvantaged and rural areas. There is a gradual 303 
shift from independent pharmacist  to corporate ownership. Other incentives and policies are required to 304 
improve access to disadvantaged areas. 305 
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Table 1: Summary of Community Pharmacy Availability and Ownership Type from Pre 2003 to 2014 
    Free State Gauteng Kwa Zulu Natal Limpopo Northern Cape Western Cape Eastern Cape Mpumalanga North West Total 
Pre2004 
Registered 
Pharmacies 
Pre 2004 Registered 217 1449 671 122 68 578 213 185 208 3711 
Closed before 1994 59 393 132 20 18 111 3 57 64 857 
Closed 1995-2003 85 529 224 45 18 189 8 49 83 1230 
Active in 2004 73 527 315 57 32 278 202 79 61 1624 
Rate of Closure per year (1995-2003) 9.44 58.78 24.89 5.00 2.00 21.00 0.89 5.44 9.22 136.67 
Closed Post 2003 22 210 108 18 10 113 115 17 9 622 
Active in 2014 51 317 207 39 22 165 87 62 52 1002 
Pharmacy to 100000 Population ratio 2.78 5.55 3.30 1.14 3.25 6.01 2.88 2.35 1.99 3.55 
Post2004 
Registered 
Pharmacies 
Post 2003 Registered 108 914 340 181 42 342 147 139 133 2346 
Independent Pharmacy Closure 14 131 43 14 13 37 4 19 9 284 
Corporate Pharmacy  Closure  1 21 5 0 0 11 1 1 3 43 
Rate of Closure per year (2004-2014) 3.36 32.91 14.18 2.91 2.09 14.64 10.91 3.36 1.91 86.27 
Independent Active 2014 62 472 192 148 16 144 94 91 84 1303 
Corporate Active 2014 31 290 100 19 13 150 48 28 37 716 
Total Active in 2014 144 1079 499 206 51 459 229 181 173 3021 
Net gain/year 6.45 50.18 16.73 13.55 1.73 16.45 2.45 9.27 10.18 127.00 
Percentage Net Gain 5.08 39.51 13.17 10.67 1.36 12.96 1.93 7.30 8.02 100.00 
Pharmacy/100000 Population ratio 5.08 8.05 4.51 3.55 4.27 7.31 3.27 4.17 4.62 5.43 
Population 
Census 
2001 2623956 9501134 9535936 4995535 983653 4624336 7022968 3365886 3072342 45725746 
2016 2834715 13399725 11065245 5799091 1193783 6279731 6996974 4335964 3748437 55653665 
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Table 2: Opening and Closing of Pharmacies at Dist rict Level 
District  
Deprivation Population Pharmacies Registered Pre 2003 Pharmacies Registered Post 2003 
Quintile Dep. Index 2001 2016 
Inactive in 2014 
Active in 
2014 
Total Active 
in 2003 
Active in 2014 
Inactive in 
2014 Total 
Active in 
2003 
Inactive in 
2003 
Free State 
Thabo Mofutsanyane 3 46082 725939 779330 26 3 23 13 16 15 2 
Fezile Dabi 4 29952 460315 494777 24 4 20 11 15 20 2 
Lejweleputswe 4 42767 657012 646920 57 5 52 14 19 19 2 
Xhariep 3 19756 135250 125884 6 1 5 3 4 2 0 
Mangaung 5 43466 645440 787804 53 9 44 10 19 37 9 
Total 2623956 2834715 166 22 144 51 73 93 15 
Kwa Zulu Natal 
Umkhanyakudi 1 26390 573341 689091 7 0 7 3 3 7 1 
Zululand 1 46844 854779 892310 18 2 16 5 7 9 2 
Uthungulu/King Cetshwayo 2 13210 885964 971135 16 3 13 16 19 18 7 
Umzinyathi 1 18719 480413 554883 12 0 12 1 1 9 2 
Amajuba 3 31444 468036 531328 25 5 20 6 11 12 1 
Uthukela 2 20149 656984 706589 11 3 8 6 9 10 1 
Umgungundlovu 3 46784 927845 1095865 63 24 39 23 47 42 4 
Illembe 2 11018 560389 657613 14 4 10 6 10 11 3 
Ethekwini 5 35431 3090121 3702231 271 61 210 122 183 151 26 
Harry Gwala 1 24167 334033 510864 5 1 4 3 4 7 0 
Ugu 2 17593 704031 753336 22 5 17 16 21 16 1 
Total 9535936 11065245 464 108 356 207 315 292 48 
Mpumalanga 
Ehlanzeni 3 26696 1447052 1754931 29 4 25 12 16 55 10 
Gert Sibanda 3 26696 900007 1135409 46 2 44 30 32 21 4 
Nkangala 4 27061 1018827 1445624 48 11 37 20 31 43 6 
Total 3365886 4335964 123 17 106 62 79 119 20 
Limpopo 
Mopani 2 22341 1061448 1159186 16 3 13 5 8 42 3 
Vhembe 2 13210 1198055 1393949 7 4 3 6 10 33 2 
Capricorn 2 16497 1154691 1330436 33 10 23 8 18 45 5 
Waterberg 3 14277 614156 745758 20 0 20 13 13 26 2 
Sekhukhune 1 31837 967185 1169762 7 1 6 7 8 21 2 
Total 4995535 5799091 83 18 65 39 57 167 14 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 95 
 
 18 
District  
Deprivation Population Pharmacies Registered Pre 2003 Pharmacies Registered Post 2003 
Quintile Dep. Index 2001 2016 
Inactive in 2014 
Active in 
2014 
Total Active 
in 2003 
Active in 2014 
Inactive in 
2014 Total 
Active in 
2003 
Inactive in 
2003 
North West 
Dr Kenneth Kaunda 4 45323 628436 742822 76 1 75 20 21 35 7 
Bojanale 2 43891 1188457 1657149 50 2 48 19 21 61 5 
Ngaka Modiri Molema 3 15738 806587 889108 22 5 17 8 13 20 0 
Dr Ruth Segomotsi Mompati 1 14305 448862 459358 8 1 7 5 6 5 0 
Total 3072342 3748437 156 9 147 52 61 121 12 
Gauteng 
Tshwane 5 26299 1982234 3275152 297 61 236 81 142 221 56 
Ekurhuleni 5 27395 2752678 3379104 251 51 200 87 138 159 28 
Sedibeng 5 36161 796756 957529 60 15 45 25 40 33 6 
City of Johannesburg 5 25934 3225309 4949346 478 74 404 108 182 321 54 
Westrand 4 27030 744157 838594 46 9 37 16 25 28 8 
Total 9501134 13399725 1132 210 922 317 527 762 152 
Northern Cape 
John T Gaetsewe 2 44015 175125 242265 6 1 5 2 3 4 3 
Frances Baard 4 12451 325501 387742 23 4 19 9 13 12 6 
Pixley ka Seme 2 29618 164607 195596 8 2 6 5 7 2 0 
Namakwa 4 16438 108110 115489 7 3 4 2 5 3 1 
Z F Mgcawu 3 28126 210310 252691 2 0 2 4 4 8 3 
Total 983653 1193783 46 10 36 22 32 29 13 
Eastern Cape 
Alfred Nzo 1 29312 392180 867864 3 2 1 0 2 9 1 
O R Tambo 1 22007 1676590 1457384 1 1 0 0 1 19 0 
Joe Gqabi 1 21976 350211 372911 5 2 3 3 5 5 0 
Chris Hani 1 32933 809582 840054 8 5 3 6 11 7 1 
Amathole 1 15036 1675901 880791 5 5 0 2 7 6 0 
Cacadu/Sarah Baartman 3 43497 388207 479922 10 9 1 22 31 11 1 
Nelson Mandela Bay 5 35796 1028016 1263051 69 66 3 41 107 54 2 
Buffalo City 4 23377 702281 834997 25 25 0 13 38 31 0 
Total 7022968 6996974 126 115 11 87 202 142 5 
Western Cape 
Central Karoo 4 18264 60483 74247 3 0 3 1 1 2 0 
Eden 4 25204 454924 611279 34 15 19 20 35 37 7 
Overberg 5 44562 203519 286786 8 1 7 10 11 10 2 
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District  
Deprivation Population Pharmacies Registered Pre 2003 Pharmacies Registered Post 2003 
Quintile Dep. Index 2001 2016 
Inactive in 2014 
Active in 
2014 
Total Active 
in 2003 
Active in 2014 
Inactive in 
2014 Total 
Active in 
2003 
Inactive in 
2003 
Cape Winelands 5 44197 730494 866001 33 10 23 14 24 35 5 
City of Cape Town 5 14611 2892243 4005015 324 83 241 110 193 194 33 
West Coast 5 1.00 282673 436403 11 4 7 10 14 16 1 
Total 4624336 6279731 413 113 300 165 278 294 48 
 
Note 
*This South African Index of Multiple Deprivation (SAIMD) includes indicators from four domains: income and material deprivation, employment deprivation, education deprivation, and living environment deprivation, 
measured at either the individual or household level according to the indicator.  
*The overall SAIMD combines these individual domains of deprivation using equal weights. 
* The results were produced at ward level, with the most deprived ward given a rank of 1 and the least deprived a rank of 4 277.[17]  
*Each district was ranked according to level of deprivation and categorised into a socio-economic quintile (SEQ).  
*Districts that fall into Quintile 1 (lowest quintile) are the most deprived districts. Those that fall into Quintile 5 are the least deprived (best-off )[17] 
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Table 3: Active Registered Pharmacies in 2014 
Active Pharmacies in 2014 
 
  Independents Corporate Total Pre 2003 registrations Total Active % Growth (New) 
Eastern Cape 94 48 142 87 229 7.03 
Free State 62 31 93 51 144 4.61 
Kwa Zulu Natal 192 100 292 207 499 14.46 
Mpumalanga 91 28 119 62 181 5.89 
Limpopo 148 19 167 39 206 8.27 
North West 84 37 121 52 173 5.99 
Gauteng 472 290 762 317 1079 37.74 
Northern Cape 16 13 29 22 51 1.44 
Western Cape 144 150 294 165 459 14.56 
TOTAL 1303 716 2019 1002 3021 100.00 
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CHAPTER 6 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The focus of this research centred around two key regulatory reforms implemented in 
2003/4 with the intention of regulating the private sector in terms of medicine 
affordability and availability. The Medicines and Related Substances Control 
Amendment Act 90 of 1997, implemented on 2 May 2003, banned the offer of discounts 
and rebates to patients and healthcare providers (bonusing section 18G) and 
establishing a pricing committee (section 22G)1. The pricing committee made 
recommendations to the Minister of Health to implement the Single Exit Price (SEP) 
in 2004. The Regulations Relating to the Ownership and Licensing of Pharmacies was 
published in GNR. 553 of 25 April 20032, where any person may, subject to the 
provisions of Regulation 7, own or have a beneficial interest in a community pharmacy 
in the Republic of South Africa.  
Both regulations had positive and negative findings, as indicated in both the empirical 
data and the literature review and their conclusions will be discussed together with 
recommendations. This chapter will also attempt to outline the limitations encountered 
in the study process, offer further policy change recommendations and possible areas 
for further study.  
6.1 Study Summary and Conclusions  
The summary focuses on the key areas of: 
 
a. The Complex Nature of Medicine Pricing 
b. Achieving transparency 
c. Affordability 
d. Availability 
 
Pricing policies as per the literature internationally is (a) complex in nature3,4, and this 
is undoubtedly true in the case of South Africa’s attempt to regulate the private sector. 
The competing nature of various policies in the democratic government may sometimes 
not be in line with what needs to be achieved by a particular government department. 
While the National Department of Health attempted to regulate medicine prices, those 
in the free market economy5 saw this as a threat to business viability having a negative 
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impact on economic growth, and an impact on job creation, all of which were also 
policy imperatives for various other departments within the South African Government. 
South Africa suffered a further delay in its implementation of the regulation when the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and 39 of its member companies prevented 
its implementation through court action6.  It is therefore important that regular 
monitoring and evaluation of all aspects of health policy changes be in place to counter 
any unintended consequences. The study did indicate the 16% of originator molecules 
were withdrawn (8 of 50) but had little impact on access as there were sufficient quality 
generic medicines available. What would be of interest would be to determine the exact 
reason for withdrawal and its consequences on the manufacturing companies, the 
economy and on the issue of industry jobs. Kieny (2016) suggested that low 
profitability results in companies leaving the market and creating gaps7. 
(b) Pricing transparency was a key imperative in the introduction of the regulations by 
the government, and it did contribute to making medicines more affordable8 to the 
patient as suggested from the empirical results provided. The literature suggests that 
more could be achieved if the NDOH took a more uniform approach to the regulations. 
By only focusing on the SEP and the dispensing fee there was a missed opportunity to 
introduce better transparency9 through a regulated logistic fee, and international 
benchmarking. More than ten years after the regulation, the logistic fee lacks 
transparency, is not consistent between the manufacturer and logistic companies, and 
is not in the public domain as envisaged by the transparent pricing system. Medicine 
prices remain artificially inflated (25% higher)4 compared to the same product 
internationally9. Manufacturers, still at their own discretion, get to set their introductory 
price, and there is still a gap in the market in terms of the presence of  incentive 
schemes10.  Further, there is a tendency to prolong patents by marginally adapting their 
product without clinical or price advantage to the patient (ever-greening). A poor 
regulatory performance in the registration process and allowing multiple dossiers of the 
same product creating backlog often prevents the more cost-effective medicines getting 
to patients sooner4.  
(c) Affordability As medicine prices reduce, it becomes more accessible at a patient 
level and is seen as an important measure of overall affordability in a country. The 
study on both the originator and generic molecules indicated that the introduction of 
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the SEP regulations had a major impact on medicine pricing in South Africa both 
immediately and over the ten-year study period.  
The percentage change in level for each category of medicines is reflected below.  
Global Core (originator)  2.45% -39.12% (mean = 19.87%, SD = 10.62% IQR = 10.2%)  
Global Core (Generic) 18.50%-91.5% (mean = 62.46%, SD = 18.64%, IQR = 24.81%)  
Regional Core (Originator) 1.77%-42.17% (mean = 23.38%, SD = 12.43%, IQR = 
15.65%)  
Regional Core (Generics) -0.70%-78.03% (mean = 44.62%, SD = 23.04%, IQR = 
37.41%)  
Supplementary (Originator) -11.68%-55.86% (mean = 22.97%, SD = 16.26%, IQR = 
17.34) Supplementary (Generic)  9.78%-78.49% (mean = 48.37%, SD = 19.44%, IQR 
= 27.53%) 
The second finding related to medicine affordability was the positioning of originator 
medicines against their generic equivalent. While the results above reflect a reduction 
in prices of originator molecules between 19.87%-23.38% depending on the basket, the 
gap between the price of the originator and its generics grew larger. Kanavos and 
Vandoros (2011)11 suggested that originator companies do not engage in price 
competition.  The price of originator medicines internationally are two and a half (2.5) 
times more than their lowest-priced generics12. In LMIC this difference could be more 
than 10–fold13. If we examine the Global Core, the difference in price is 4.29 times 
lower than the originator prior to 2004. Directly after the introduction in 2004 of the 
SEP, the difference between the price of the originator molecule and their cheapest 
generic showed an 11.1 fold increase in South Africa, in line with Cameron and Laing 
(2010)13 suggestion for LMICs. Bangalee et al. (2016) revealed in their study on 
cardiovascular drugs a 40% difference in prices of generics against the branded 
versions14, and this is confirmed in the pre-2004 comparative in this study (42.9%). 
This study further suggests that the introduction of the SEP increased this differential, 
at least in the global core basket, to 111%. This may also provide a reason for eight (8) 
of the fifty (50) originator molecules being withdrawn after 2004.  
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A further observation of the results, supported by Bangalee et al. (2016)14, indicate that 
increased generic competition is not a predictor of lower prices. Generic entries tend to 
clump together at a similar price to the existing generics. One solution to overcome this 
phenomenon is to use the Canadian Alberta model. In April 2014, Alberta introduced 
their generic policy where new generic entries start at 70% of the brand if there is only 
one generic entrant, and then subsequent generic medicines that entered the market 
were priced at 50%, 25% and 18% respectively of the originator15.  
(d) Availability Pharmaceutical care is an important spectrum of healthcare in any 
country. "Ensuring access to quality medicines in under-served areas has been one of 
the most difficult bottlenecks to overcome in global health”, says Ariel Pablos-Mendez, 
assistant administrator for Global Health at USAID(2016)16. Regulating access to 
medicines and pharmaceutical services in rural communities is just as complex as 
regulating the price of medicines themselves. Ownership changes in themselves in the 
private sector do not seem to improve access in areas of need17,18,19,20,21. While 
pharmacists and pharmacies play a critical role at multiple levels including making 
medicines accessible, they face the challenges of low volumes, limited and expensive 
workforce, low-profit margins, slow economic growth in rural economies, inability to 
participate in economies of scale, unsupportive regulations and weak profit margins22.  
The issue of being able to generate sufficient income23 to support a rural operation was 
further highlighted in the Rural Policy Brief by Salako et al. (2017). In South Africa, 
Ward et al. (2014) agreed in their findings from key opinion leaders that the problem 
of service provision by the private pharmacy in rural and township areas was a conflict 
of profitability and provision of pharmaceutical care21. Other perceptions in the Ward 
et al. (2014) study confirmed that the regulations did not reverse the inequity in 
distribution, that the process of acquiring licences from the NDOH could not be trusted 
and that the criteria for issuing of these licenses need to be re-evaluated.  
Post-1994 saw a steady year-on-year influx of rural population into the urban economic 
hubs to the extent that the United Nations projects that by 2030, 71.3% of the South 
African population will be urbanised24.  The migration pattern mention by Cross 
(2009)25  where the population outflow from Limpopo, Free-State, Mpumalanga and 
northern KwaZulu Natal into Gauteng and Western Cape (WC) reflects in our study the 
poor growth in pharmacy numbers in these four areas and the growth in both the WC 
and Gauteng. Migration also affects other healthcare professionals in the area and 
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contributes to the lack of support for business viability. For the majority of the country 
except in the urban metropolitan, the pharmacy growth did not keep pace with both 
government expectation and the population growth.  
 
6.2 Policy Recommendations 
Because of the complex nature of the medicine policy environment, it is imperative that 
Governments create a permanent monitoring and evaluation committee. South Africa 
has a Pricing Committee (PC) and a register of medicines reflecting the SEP. It may be 
necessary for key questions around pricing models to be identified by the PC and 
offered as areas of research at the universities as masters and PhD programmes. There 
is a need to identify possible problem areas before and after policy implementation 
through the ongoing assessments via a pharmaceutical analytics unit whose ongoing 
task will be to provide technical support, develop reimbursement protocols, monitor 
utilization and have stakeholder engagements to pool efforts in pricing policy.  
In most high-income countries, either the state or insurance covers the costs of 
pharmaceuticals, giving them the edge to negotiate better prices with manufacturers 
through bulk purchasing.  In low-income countries more than half and up to 90% are 
out of pocket payments.   As South Africa moves towards Universal Health Coverage, 
we have an opportunity to investigate a single purchaser model at least for the 
medicines considered on the Essential Medicines List (EML). The current tender model 
used by the South African Government has achieved a significant price decrease on 
most medicines showing a substantial price discrepancy between private and public27. 
This public benefit policy could have a positive impact on the prices of medicines to 
the private payer through pooled funding. There is a need for a better understanding of 
how manufacturers price differently in the public and private space to allow 
policymakers to improve procurement through a single purchaser system without 
causing unintended consequences to the pharmaceutical market.  
The National Drug Policy in 1996 specified a national essential list but allowed the 
medical schemes to use this as a guide. This resulted in schemes being responsible for 
their own selection, creating a multitude of lists adding unnecessary holding costs to 
the supply chain. It may be wise to follow the tenant of the NDP in rationalising the 
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drug pricing system in the private sector by mandating the use of the lowest-priced 
generics,  allowing in the interim, as we move towards UHC, a reference price system 
or the use of a maximum medical aid price (MMAP). Enforcing other aspects of the 
medicine pricing model initially proposed having a fixed and regulated logistic fee 
together with a fixed professional fee will add transparency to the private market. 
More can be achieved through international benchmarking. While South Africa has 
achieved substantial price reduction in the private sector as determined in this study, 
the country still pays high prices for their medicines. The Government notice on the 17 
December 2010 outlining the Methodology for International Benchmarking of Prices 
of Medicines and Scheduled Substance in South Africa with the aim to remove the price 
distortion for medicines was never implemented.  It would be a key policy regulation 
implementation in the immediate future to maintain the downward trend in medicine 
prices in South Africa.  
Price clustering, as reflected in our study around generic medicines, maybe a result of 
some payers in the private sector setting reference prices.  Manufacturers of expensive 
drugs may lower their prices to meet referencing, equally, there is the danger of lower-
priced medicines increasing their price to meet reference prices and thus increase their 
profit. There is a need for a better generic pricing policy from setting a cap on the 
introduction of the first generic relative to the originator to introducing the second, third 
and subsequent generics at a much lower reducing price than the first as reflected in 
countries like Canada. This may add to the generic substitution policy already in place 
in South Africa and lead to lower medicine prices.  
The final policy recommendation relates to the licensing of pharmacies. A transparent 
pricing system must ensure that each step of the process has appropriate regulations, 
including the Single Exit Price (SEP), a fixed and regulated logistic fee and an 
appropriate, affordable fixed dispensing fee.   Medicine will be available in any part of 
the country at the same regulated fee, a key motivation by the National Department of 
Health in its formulation of the policy. If the competition aspect of this essential service 
is removed, then access to where medicines become available will be based on areas of 
need. It will remove the need for duplication of services in the same location as seen in 
the current model in South Africa and in other parts of the world where urban and 
metropolitan clustering, as seen in this study, is the order of the day. Restricting the 
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number of pharmacies by a single owner, a tool successfully employed in other 
countries, unless it meets the demand in a rural area will help solve the problem of 
making services available in outlying areas.  Encouraging service delivery may not be 
a licensing issue alone. It may require further stimuli such as higher dispensing fees or 
rural allowance as in the case of Government pharmacists in South Africa, assisted 
rental structures in government buildings and preferential contracts to supply state 
patients. This will assist in overcoming the barrier seen currently in getting 
pharmaceutical services in areas of need.  
 
6.3 Thesis Limitations  
The lack of empirical data in LMICs3 was a limitation in terms of the literature review 
and comparative analysis of the changes in South Africa. The author notes the limitation 
of data available prior to the implementation of the regulations reflected in the 
Interrupted Time Series graphs produced. Bernal et al. (2016)38 suggests that there are 
“no fixed limits regarding the number of data points”. The power depends on “various 
other factors, including distribution of data points before and after the intervention, 
variability within the data, strength of effect, and the presence of confounding effects 
such as seasonality”39. Inspection of the visual results shows that the trend before 
intervention does not show drastic changes.  
Penfold’s et al. (2013)40 suggestion of using a non-equivalent control was not possible 
as it does not exist in South Africa. The only comparative is the public sector that uses 
a tender system where data is not publicly available. The price files accessed were from 
computer vendors and community pharmacies where prices are further verified via 
payment systems on SEP from payers. Segmented regression assumes a linear trend41, 
but as medicine prices do not tend to change within the year and remain stable over the 
four quarters,  hence a single data point was used to reflect the price for the year.  
As the ownership regulations did not impact the location of public and private 
institutional pharmacies in the country, their location was removed from the data set. 
As a result, the pharmaceutical service per population ratio may not be reflective except 
for the community pharmacy. The type of ownership was restricted to the independent 
and corporate pharmacy only where lay ownership was not investigated as this does not 
appear on the SAPC database. Only a single database was examined and mapped as it 
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is assumed that a pharmacy can only open once it is recorded on the SAPC register. 
Even if a license is issued, it may not be an active pharmacy unless determined active 
by Council after an inspection.  
 
6.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
The authors acknowledge the limitation that a change in medicine price determines 
change in expenses, but it may not imply savings to the end user. This could be the 
subject of further research.   
South Africa had in 2004 also introduced the Single Exit Price for pharmaceuticals and 
the regulation relating to the dispensing fee, both with the intention to control costs of 
pharmaceuticals. The consequences of this regulated market, which reduced 
profitability and the open ownership, which reduced volumes of prescription to small 
pharmacies may have had an additive impact on that lack of growth in rural and 
underserved areas. While it is beyond the scope of this study, it may be of value in 
future investigation.  
Liberalisation, like in many other countries, has resulted in multiple pharmacies in the 
same location. This may have an impact on the South African 2030 human resource 
plan for the country and may need to be assessed. Added to this, it has created a demand 
for young pharmacists who tend to move directly for community service to be the 
Responsible Pharmacist (RP) without gaining the requisite skills in this senior 
management role. It is important to access the impact on the quality of service provision 
in these environments.  
6.5 Contribution of the Thesis/Conclusion 
A large body of research and literature can be found in developed markets28 with well- 
funded health insurance scheme and universal coverage, but little exists in LMIC42, 
especially those with similar health systems as South Africa. This thesis will contribute 
to the research pool in LMIC. This study provides evidence of the impact of medicine 
pricing intervention from a middle–income country, and useful lessons can be drawn 
by other developing countries looking at introducing medicine price controls. 
Measuring outcomes of policy changes as was done in this study, allows   comparison 
to Governments target levels and expectation, make a comparison to international 
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available study outcomes and identify areas of strength and weaknesses for further 
improvements. Systematic assessments and monitoring based on standard indicators 
recommended, in this case by WHO/HAI31, should be a routine part of planning and 
programme management and the objective indicators researched will contribute to 
South Africa’s ongoing need to provide equitable, affordable and accessible medicines.  
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